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Abstract 
This paper uses time point decomposition methods of fluctuation factors to analyze the role of China’s real economic activity in 
oil price fluctuations. The research results show that demand shocks attributable to Chinese economy could not affect oil prices 
in recent years, particularly the hikes in 2008, and they further find that oil specific-demand shocks and the demand shocks of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had notable effects on the real price of crude oil. As an 
alternate explanation, we reveal this phenomenon using the proportion of China’s oil consumption to total global consumption. 
Furthermore, this paper finds that the rise in oil prices was caused by the oil specific-demand shocks but that the fall in oil prices 
was caused by the oil specific-demand shocks and the OECD demand shocks. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of ECE 2016. 
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1. Introduction 
On July 11, 2008, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices hit record highs at $ 147.27 / barrel. Unlike the first and 
second oil crises in the 1970s, the usual shortage of oil production was not found in this oil price hike. Accordingly, 
economists turned their focus to the demand for crude oil. Meanwhile, economists became more concerned with the 
demands of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and other emerging economies, particularly China. 
Whether the strong oil demand from the rapidly growing Chinese economy caused the 2008 oil price hikes or not 
has become an issue of much debate. Kilian & Hicks (2013) argued that economic growth of Asia's emerging 
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economies, including China and India, caused a rise in oil prices between 2003 and 2008. Hamilton (2009a, 2009b) 
also showed that the 2008 oil price hikes were caused by the strong demand of China confronting the stagnating 
world production of oil. In contrast, Du et al. (2010), using the Granger causality test, determined that real economic 
activity of China had no significant effect on oil prices. The motivation of this study is to confirm whether the 
Chinese economy has affected the real price of crude oil during the last two decades. 
Meanwhile, the recent global economic environment has undergone dramatic change, for example, global 
liquidity flood, severe price fluctuations of international bulk commodity, rapid rise of emerging economies and so 
on. This paper explores the economic factors affecting international oil prices and focuses on the role of the real 
economic activity of China in the 2008 oil price hikes and then perceives the dynamic evolution rule of oil prices. 
Aside from using the impulse response functions of a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model, this study also 
builds the time point decomposition methods of fluctuation factors to observe oil price fluctuations and the 
cumulative impact of every economic factor on oil prices at arbitrary time points in sample intervals. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use the real economic activity of China as a single variable 
in a structural VAR model and to use the share of China’s oil consumption in total world consumption to explain its 
effects on oil prices. Moreover, we gain some awareness of the dynamic evolution rule of oil price fluctuations.  
2. Literature review 
Since the two oil crises occurred in the 1970s, economists have been studying the relationship between oil price 
shocks and real economic activity, with a special interest in 2008, when international oil prices hit record highs. 
Two themes prevail in the empirical papers. One explores the effects of oil price shocks on most oil importing 
countries, as the shocks led to negative consequences such as stagflation and decreases in real wages. At present, 
economists stress the study of the mechanisms of these effects and suggest that authorities implement monetary 
policies to suppress these negative effects. 
The other theme investigates the causes of rise in the real price of crude oil. Between September 2003 and July 
2008, crude oil prices surged in the international market, a fact that prompted economists to revisit the fundamental 
issues of where oil price fluctuations originate and which factors affect oil prices. Previous studies, such as 
Hamilton (1985), commonly attributed increases in oil prices to shortages in supply in the international market prior 
to 1973. Such shortages, which stemmed from political strife in the Middle East, are exogenous to the global 
economic system. Since 1973, it has been widely accepted that the real price of crude oil is endogenous to global 
macroeconomic conditions (Rotemberg ˂Woodford, 1996; Barsky ˂ Kilian, 2004; Hamilton, 2003). Thus, real 
economic activity can also affect the real price of crude oil. 
Following the study of the international crude oil market, Krichene (2002) observed the low price elasticity of 
short-run supply before 2002. However, since 2003, the supply of international crude oil has not dropped, even as 
oil prices continued to increase from 2003 to 2008. According to microeconomic theory, oil prices are determined 
by the equilibrium point in the crude oil supply curve and demand curve. Therefore, economists have focused on 
demand in the international crude oil market and on global real economic activity. A large body of empirical 
literature, including Kilian (2009), Krichene (2002), He et al. (2010), and Frenkel ˂ Rose (2010), discussed the 
essential cause of oil price changes. 
Hamilton (2009a, b) found that the oil price run-up of 2007–2008 was caused by a combination of the strong 
demand for oil and stagnating world production. These two reasons are widely accepted as the causes behind the oil 
price changes after 2000. However, while Hamilton (2009b) highlighted China’s oil consumption at a high growth 
rate, but he did not construct an econometric model to simulate the process of China’s effects on the real price of 
crude oil. Furthermore, Hamilton (2009b) could not explain the reason behind the stagnation of world oil 
production. Frenkel ˂ Rose (2010) suggested that the loose monetary policy in most developed countries was often 
accompanied by a low real interest rate, which increased demand and reduced supply for oil-producing countries 
because these countries would rather store oil. As evidence of the loose monetary policy, the prices of other 
international bulk commodities, such as corn, cattle, copper and platinum also surged during this period. 
Kilian ˂ Hicks (2013) used a polynomial distributed lag model to calculate the effects of the economies of 
China and India as one unit on oil prices. When measuring the impact of the two economies on oil prices, their 
practical conclusion was that a 0.1% increase in the total forecasts of the GDPs of China and India will result in a 
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5% increase in oil prices, where the actual text of the GDPs in China and India is a share of the world GDP. The 
problem is that the proportion of China’s real GDP to the world GDP is higher than the proportion of China’s crude 
oil consumption to the world's oil consumption. Therefore, we want to confirm the role of China’s real economic 
activity in oil price fluctuations. 
3. Econometric Model 
The following structural VAR model is considered: 
     ܦ଴ ௧ܻ ൌ ߁ ൅ σ ܦ௜௦௜ୀଵ ௧ܻି௜ ൅ ݑ௧                                                                                                                        (1) 
where ௧ܻ ൌ ሺ݋݈݅݌ݎ݋݀௧ǡ ݋݁ܿ݀݅݌௧ǡ ݄ܿ݅݊ܽ݅݌௧ǡ ݋݈݅݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ሻĄ is the vector of four variables,  ݋݈݅݌ݎ݋݀௧  is the world 
production of crude oil, ݋݁ܿ݀݅݌௧  is the industrial production of the OECD countries, ݄ܿ݅݊ܽ݅݌௧  is the industrial 
production of China, and ݋݈݅݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧  is the real price of oil. ߁ is the vector of intercept terms, and ݑ௧ is the vector of 
mutually uncorrelated structural innovations with a zero mean and a non-singular variance-covariance matrix σ௨. 
The model considers that ݑ௧ includes one supply shock and three demand shocks: the supply of world crude oil, the 
industrial production of the OECD countries and China, and oil specific-demand.  
To estimate the structural VAR model, we convert it into a reduced-form VAR model: 
     ௧ܻ ൌ ܥ଴߁ ൅ σ ܥ଴௦௜ୀଵ ܦ௜ ௧ܻି௜ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                                     (2) 
where ܥ଴ ൌ ܦ଴ିଵ, has a recursive structure such that the reduced-form errors vector ߝ௧, whose variance-covariance 
matrix is σఌ, is expressed by 
 ߝ௧ ൌ ܥ଴ݑ௧                                                                                                                                                        (3) 
If we let ܤ ൌ ܥ଴߁ˈܣ௜ ൌ ܥ଴ܦ௜ , then Eq. (3) is converted to Eq. (4) as follows: 
     ௧ܻ ൌ ܤ ൅ σ ܣ௜௦௜ୀଵ ௧ܻି௜ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                                              (4) 
Eq. (4) is converted by the lag operator such that: 
      ܣሺܮሻ ௧ܻ ൌ ܤ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                                                             (5) 
where ܣሺܮሻ ൌ ܫସ െ σ ܣ௜௦௜ୀଵ ǡ ܫସ  is a four-order identity matrix. If both sides of Eq. (5) are then multiplied by 
ܣሺܮሻିଵ, the equation above can be converted to a vector moving average (VMA) model: 
        ௧ܻ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߆ሺܮሻݑ௧                                                                                                                                            (6) 
where ߤ ൌ ܣሺܮሻିଵܤˈ߆ሺܮሻ ൌ ܣሺܮሻିଵܥ଴ ൌ ߆ሺͲሻ ൅ ߆ሺͳሻ ൅ ڮڮ, and the numbers in brackets indicate the time 
order. We are concerned about the impulse impact on oil prices, that is, the reaction of ݕସǡ௧ to ݑ୧ǡ௧, exhibited by the 
following partial derivative functions: 
      ߠସଵ
ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ப୷రǡ౪శ౩ப୳భǡ౪ ǡ ߠସଶ
ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ப୷రǡ౪శ౩ப୳మǡ౪ ǡߠସଷ
ሺ௦ሻ ൌ ப୷రǡ౪శ౩ப୳యǡ౪ ǡ ߠସସ
ሺୱሻ ൌ ப୷రǡ౪శ౩ப୳రǡ౪                                                                       (7) 
We build time point decomposition methods of fluctuation factors: First, at any time in the sample intervals, a 
certain variable fluctuation causes a shock, which influences other variables when it appears. Second, another shock 
is generated at the next time point, which then influences other variables. Last, at a certain point in time, we add all 
the effects from previous shocks to obtain the accumulated impulse impact at a certain time. Using ݑଵǡ௧  as an 
example, Equation (8) describes the details of the method. ݁௧ shows the cumulative effects of ݑଵǡ௧ݕସǡ௧, that is, 
        
( 1)
1 41 1,1e uT  
      
( 2) (1)
2 41 1,1 41 1,2e u uT T   
      
( 3) ( 2) (1)
3 41 1,1 41 1,2 41 1,3e u u uT T T    
      
 
41 1,0e =
n i
t t ii
uT  ¦                                                                                                                                       (8) 
4. Model Specification 
Before conducting the empirical analyses, a number of model specification issues should be addressed. 
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4.1. Variables and sample intervals 
First, the global production of crude oil has been recorded by the United States (U.S.) Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) since January 1973 (1973:01). This record is the best available index with respect to global 
crude oil.  
Second, although Kilian (2009) uses dry-cargo ocean freight rates as the index of global real economic activity, 
shipping is easily affected by weather conditions and pirate activities, which may cause delays in representations of 
real economic activity. For this reason, the current study does not use this index. Based on the purposes of our 
analysis, the index of global real economic activity should include the real economic activity of China as a single 
variable. The OECD group, which encompasses almost all developed countries, accounted for 51% of the world’s 
real GDP in 2009, according to the Penn World Table 6.2. The real GDP, which is commonly calculated quarterly, 
provides a coarse description for real economic activity, and it has been suggested that it is better to substitute the 
real GDP with data from a shorter frequency. As industrial production is an important part of the real GDP and is 
also a main sector of oil consumption, we assume that the industrial production of a country can represent the entire 
economic activity of that country. For example, the proportion of industrial production to China’s real GDP was 
46.59% in 2011. Thus, the industrial production of China and the OECD countries provides the best index for 
monthly frequency.  
Third, there is no general consensus on which real price of crude oil should be used in empirical papers given that 
there are several oil price series, including WTI prices and the U.S. refiner acquisition costs of imported crude oil 
(RAC; See Fig. 1). Both of the price systems are in U.S. dollars. Kilian (2009) and Kilian ˂ Vigfusson (2011) 
suggested the RAC is a better index because, during the price controls in the 1970s, the WTI reflected only the 
controlled prices. Accordingly, to compare our results with the results of Kilian (2009), we use the RAC in the 
current work. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Real prices of WTI and RAC (dollar/barrel) 
The current paper focuses on the role of China’s real economic activity in crude oil price fluctuations. Until 
January 1994, the EIA had not calculated, on a monthly basis, the oil consumption of China and other areas of the 
world. Given the data restrictions, we choose 1994:01 to 2012:05 as the full sample interval for this study.  
4.2. Unit root tests 
We test the stationarity of the time series by analyzing its order of integration on the basis of a unit root test, and 
the index of industrial production is seasonally adjusted. All data are from monthly frequencies and are expressed in 
the first difference of the logarithms to ensure the stationarity of each variable. More specifically, we conduct an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and a Phillips-Perron (PP) test. The null hypothesis of the tests is that the 
series has a unit root. The results of these two unit root tests are listed in Table 1 and indicate that the first log-
difference variables are stationary. 
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Table 1. Unit root tests 
Variables ADF Tests  PP Tests 
݋݈݅݌ݎ݋݀௧ െͳʹǤͺͳͺ͵כככ െͳͷǤͻʹͷͲכככ
ܿΰ݅݊ܽ݅݌௧ െͳͶǤͷʹͷͶכככ െʹͷǤ͵ͻͻ͹כככ
݋݁ܿ݀݅݌௧ െͷǤ͵ʹ͸ͷכככ െͺǤ͹ͷͶͺכככ
݋݈݅݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௧ െͻǤͷ͸ͷ͸כככ െͻǤ͵͵͹Ͳכככ
Note˖*/**/*** denote the rejection of the null hypothesis at a 10%/5%/1% critical level. 
4.3. Identifying restrictions 
To estimate this model, the ܭଶ elements of ܥ଴ should be recovered, which cannot be uniquely specified without 
further restrictions. Given the symmetry of the variance-covariance matrix, σఌ  identifies only 10 independent 
equations. Thus, 6 short-run restrictions must be determined by economic theory. 
According to our calculations, the price supply elasticity of crude oil from 1994 to 2012 is 0.043. That is, the 
supply curve of crude oil is approximately vertical in the short-term. Simultaneously, the demand curve of crude oil, 
shifted by the three oil demand shocks (the demands of the OECD countries and China and the oil specific-demand), 
changes the real price of crude oil. The production of crude oil, which is determined only by the current capacity of 
the oil companies, is unaffected by the oil prices and the real economic activity within the same month because the 
oil companies cannot modify their mining plan within a month as it would entail large costs, as indicated by Kilian 
(2009). Thus, these companies store crude oil in the ground rather than produce it at a low interest rate (Frenkel ˂ 
Rose, 2010). Therefore, in matrix ܥ଴, ܿଵଶ ൌ ܿଵଷ ൌ ܿଵସ ൌ Ͳ.  
Moreover, with respect to the international trade of crude oil, as the main mode of transport is shipping, the time 
spent at sea and in the refinery delays the effects of oil price increases on real economic activity. Accordingly, 
similar to Kilian (2009), we assume that in at least one month, real oil price increases can negatively impact real 
economic activity, including the industrial production of the OECD countries and China. Thus, ܿଶସ ൌ ܿଷସ ൌ Ͳ. 
Next, we consider the relationship between the industrial production of the OECD countries and China. An 
important index that describes the mutual relationship of these two economies is the export share of one area to the 
total amount. For example, the export share range of the OECD countries to China was between 2.67% and 10.37% 
in the sample intervals. By contrast, the range in the export share of China to the OECD was between 69.07% and 
86.86%. These two different indices suggest a one-sided relationship in which demand fluctuations in China have 
little effect on the exports of the OECD. Conversely, demand fluctuations in the OECD countries can influence 
China’s economic activity. That is, while the industrial production of China may affect one sector or one country in 
the OECD, it cannot influence the total industrial production of the OECD countries within a single month because 
the OECD group supplies all developed countries and the industrial production of those countries provides for all 
industries. Therefore, ܿଶଷ ൌ Ͳ. 
5. Empirical results and analyses 
5.1. Impulse response functions 
The first panel† in Fig. 2 shows that a positive oil supply shock causes a transitory decline in global oil prices, 
which is then followed by a partial reversal of that decline within the first five months. This response is consistent 
with the view that an increase in oil supply in one region will result in a decrease in crude oil supply elsewhere in 
the world, as indicated by Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009a, b). Oil supply shocks trigger a small, transitory 
statistically relevant impact on the real price of crude oil for approximately ten months. This result further indicates 
 
 
†  The order of the panel is from left to right, top to bottom. 
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that oil supply shocks have little predictive power in the real price of crude oil, as Kilian (2008) suggested. This 
phenomenon has caused us to pay attention to oil demand shocks. 
 
Fig. 2. Responses of the real price of crude oil to structural shocks 
Notes: The confidence intervals were constructed using a wild bootstrap.  Point estimates with one- and two-standard error bands. 
In the second panel of Fig. 2, the demand shocks from the real economic activity of OECD countries have 
persistent and statistically significant effects on the real price of crude oil for approximately five months. The effects 
reflect the large demand and consumption of OECD countries in the international crude oil market. For example, in 
February 1994 and August 2007, the oil consumption proportion of the OECD countries to the oil consumption of 
the world is 66.49% and 58.01%, respectively.  
In the third panel of Fig. 2, the demand shocks from China’s real economic activity exhibit only a small and 
transitory effect on the real price of crude oil for the first three months. The influence, however, becomes negative 
after four months and then almost completely disappears after about eight months. After Deng Xiaoping gave 
speeches during his inspection tour of southern China in 1992, the industrial production of China boomed in 1993 
and 1994. Later, a recession in industrial production occurred because China tightened its monetary policy in the 
late 1990s. The fluctuations, with respect to China’s industrial production, suggest that China’s real economic 
activity has no significant effects on international oil prices.  
As shown in the last panel of Fig. 2, we find the most important factor of oil price fluctuations in the two most 
recent decades to be the shock related to oil specific-demand. This shock has a persistent and highly significant 
effect on the real price of crude oil, a result that is consistent with Kilian (2009) in that it increases the real price of 
crude oil by approximately 10% within the first five months, which is an influence that is greater than that of the 
other factors in our model.  
In the sample intervals, the changes in the real price of crude oil were primarily due to the shocks of oil specific-
demand and the demand of real economic activity in the OECD countries. The real economic activity of China 
imposed only minimal and temporary effects on the real price of crude oil.  
5.2. Time point decompositions of oil prices 
The impulse response functions only reflect the effects of one shock of a given size on the real price of crude oil 
for the whole sample of intervals, and thus, they do not clearly reveal the cause of oil price fluctuations for a 
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designated time point. Combined the impulse response functions and the residual series of the model, we plotted 
Fig. 3, which shows the accumulated impact of each shock observed at each time point in the sample intervals. 
The first panel in Fig. 3 shows that the historical contributions of oil supply shocks to the real price of crude oil 
were minimal. Therefore, they are disregarded. Unlike the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, after the 1990s, the supply 
shocks of crude oil are not the main factor behind the oil price fluctuations. For example, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production cuts in 2002 failed to cause a significant increase in oil prices, 
while the production increase in 2003 failed to cause a significant decrease in oil prices. This panel also indicates 
that the effects of crude oil supply shocks on oil prices is transitory as it reveals the latest features of global crude oil 
production – an increase in oil production in one region may result in a decrease in oil production in other region. To 
maintain stable oil prices, it is necessary to maintain a stable level of global oil production, a conclusion that seems 
to have become the consensus of the oil producing countries. 
  
Fig. 3. Time point decomposition of the real price of crude oil 
Because the OECD countries consume the majority of the global oil, the second panel in Fig. 3 shows that the 
demand shocks of the OECD countries imposed a notable increase in the real price of crude oil in 2002, 2004, 2006 
and 2010. In contrast, after the subprime mortgage crisis, the OECD economy experienced a recession that 
significantly reduced oil demand and thus led to a decline in oil prices for the 2007 to 2009 period.  
Although many economists, such as Kilian ˂ Hicks (2013) and Hamilton (2009a, 2009b), believe that China’s 
economy is one element responsible for the 2007–2008 oil price hikes, the results, as displayed in the third panel of 
Fig. 3, do not support this conclusion. While demand shocks of China’s real economic activity played only a weak 
role in the real price of crude oil in 2005, they slightly reduced the real prices of oil in 1996 and 2009. The reduction 
of oil prices in 1996 occurred owing to the decreasing demand, because the central government of China tightened 
the monetary policy, which originated from the over-boom of the industrial production in 1993–1994. The 2009 
reduction in oil prices was due to the impact of the global financial crisis as it caused a slowdown in China’s 
economic growth, thus reducing the demand for oil. 
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The nearly two decades financialization of international crude oil market combined with the global liquidity flood 
after 2000 resulted in oil specific-demand becoming the most important factor (see the fourth panel of Fig. 3) behind 
the fluctuations in oil prices. After the August 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, the U.S. and other developed 
countries implemented a loose monetary policy, which was caused by the weakening of the dollar (Kesicki, 2010). 
After the 2008 subprime crisis evolved into a global financial crisis, oil prices in July of 2008 hit record highs at $ 
147.27 / barrel.  
Although there are many studies about the soaring oil prices in 2008, there are very few studies regarding the 
drop in oil prices in 2009. According to the results of this paper, we found that in addition to the withdrawal of 
speculative funds from outside the crude oil futures market, the recession of the OECD economy in 2008 reduced 
the demand for crude oil (see the second panel in Fig. 3), which is also an important reason for the collapse of the 
2009 oil prices. 
5.3.  Why China’s demand shocks did not significantly affect oil prices? 
A widespread perception has recently held that the real economic activity of some emerging economies, such as 
China and India, stimulates a strong demand for crude oil, thereby causing a rise in the real price of crude oil. We 
prove that China’s economy in the past two decades has not played a significant role in oil price hikes, especially in 
2008, as shown in the third panel in Fig.3. Thus, as an alternate explanation, this paper exploits the proportion of 
China's crude oil consumption with respect to the world’s total consumption to explain this conclusion. 
Although the oil consumption of China has been growing at an annual rate of 7% since 1990, the share of China’s 
oil consumption with respect to the world consumption was only 11.33% until May 2012, whereas the same indices 
for the OECD countries and the U.S. were 51.38% and 21.10%, respectively. Within the sample intervals of this 
paper, the growth rate of China's oil consumption (annual rate of 7%) is less than China's economic growth rate 
(average growth rate greater than 8%). However, when the proportion of GDP is used in the calculations, China’s 
role actually expands (see Table 2).  
Table 2. The proportion of China's GDP and oil consumption to the world’s GDP and oil consumption 
Items 1996 2002 2009 
GDP  9.2%  12.3%  15.9% 
Oil consumption  5.0% 6.6%  9.9% 
6. Conclusion 
This paper uses a structural VAR model and time point decomposition methods of fluctuation factors to 
investigate the causes of the variability of real oil prices in the international market from 1994:01 to 2012:05. The 
results show that oil-specific demand shocks had strong and persistent effects on the real price of crude oil. The 
demand shocks attributed to the real economic activity of China did not affect the real price of crude oil in sample 
intervals, and particularly did not cause the 2008 hikes. As an alternate explanation, we attempt to relate this 
phenomenon with the proportion of China’s oil consumption to the total global consumption.  
Based on a panoramic analysis of the real price of crude oil, we argue some dynamic evolution rules for oil price 
fluctuations: First, the largest factor affecting international oil prices is oil-specific demand. Second, a rise in oil 
prices is generally only caused by oil-specific demand, while predict a decline in oil prices is generally caused by 
both the withdrawal of oil-specific demand and a stable oil supply during the recession of the global economy. Thus, 
the increases and decreases in oil prices are the results of different factors. Third, in addition to the current imperfect 
analysis methods of time series and because the futures market speculation is difficult to monitor, it is problematic 
to accurately predict the short-term futures prices of international crude oil. 
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Appendix A. Data sources 
Data Sources 
WTI and RAC EIA 
World production of crude oil EIA 
Oil consumption of China and the world EIA 
Industrial production of OECD countries www.oecd.org 
Industrial production of China 
Trade statistics 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
IMF 
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